Firms` Strategic Decisions: Theoretical and Empirical Findings

Author(s): Kazuhiro Ohnishi

DOI: 10.2174/9781681082530116020008

Price-Setting Games and Entry Deterrence

Pp: 142-161 (20)

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Abstract

SHS investigation development is considered from the geographical and historical viewpoint. 3 stages are described. Within Stage 1 the work was carried out in the Department of the Institute of Chemical Physics in Chernogolovka where the scientific discovery had been made. At Stage 2 the interest to SHS arose in different cities and towns of the former USSR. Within Stage 3 SHS entered the international scene. Now SHS processes and products are being studied in more than 50 countries.

Abstract

This chapter considers a two-stage price-setting model of an established firm and a potential entrant and investigates whether the use of strategic commitments by the established firm is effective to deter entry. Most studies on entry deterrence examine the situation of strategic complements where goods are substitutes in Bertrand competition. Therefore, the chapter divides demand functions into four cases, and correlates each case with either of two opposite strategic commitments. This chapter examines the entry-deterring equilibrium outcomes resulting from the strategic commitments of the established firm in all four cases and shows that strategic commitments can be used as an effective tool for entry deterrence in Bertrand competition.

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